It’s Election Day, and the votes are being tabulated. So how can we know the counts are accurate and the data is safe? Derek Tisler, counsel in the elections and government program at the nonpartisan Brennan Center, joins host Krys Boyd to discuss election tabulation and security, why we might not know the official winner on election night, and what makes new technology so effective in counting votes.
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Transcript
Krys Boyd [00:00:00] You may have heard conspiracy theories about large numbers of non-citizens or otherwise ineligible people casting votes in U.S. elections. To be clear, there is no substantial evidence of this. There are lots of safeguards in place all over the country to ensure the people who vote are legally entitled to do so. But we should also be clear on this There are some real and valid concerns about election security in this country. From Kera in Dallas, this is Think. I’m Krys Boyd. For one thing, a lot of jurisdictions are relying on old or outdated voting technology. How outdated, you ask. Some elections administrators have turned to eBay to buy replacement parts for machines no longer in production. And many places are using systems that could be vulnerable to hackers looking to stir up trouble. It’s a big enough concern that the nonpartisan Law and Policy Institute, the Brennan Center for Justice, has issued a list of recommendations for election security. And today we’re going to talk about how to get them done with Derek Tisler, who is counsel in the elections and government program at the Brennan Center. Derek, welcome to Think.
Derek Tisler [00:01:05] Yeah, thanks so much for having me on.
Krys Boyd [00:01:07] Since I just mentioned this common concern many Americans have that non-citizens are voting in large numbers in many places. I should ask whether this is something the Brennan Center has looked into. Like, are you confident that voter fraud is not something we broadly need to be worried about right now?
Derek Tisler [00:01:24] We are confident about this. So this is something that the Brennan Center has looked into. This is something that, you know, numerous other organizations, academics, election experts, whoever it is, have looked into this issue and they have found over and over that non-citizen voting is extraordinarily rare, like fractions of a percent across a huge span of elections. And the reason for that is for federal elections. It is illegal for non-citizens to vote in that process. And all states have multiple systems in place to make sure that only eligible voters are registering and that only eligible voters are able to cast a ballot.
Krys Boyd [00:02:07] Okay. How does rampant conspiracy theory around voting of this kind in the absence of evidence, create its own set of problems?
Derek Tisler [00:02:19] There are a number of problems that can come with this. So for one, you know, a lot of these claims about non-citizens voting voter fraud are really meant to undermine confidence in the election process. And they’re and they’re being stirred up by people with political aims, with other incentives and goals to, you know, maybe achieve fame, whatever it may be. But the whole point is to undermine confidence in the system. So that’s one part of it. And then the other part is we have seen in some cases this this idea that non-citizens are voting. It has resulted in policy changes that make it difficult for many eligible voters to be able to cast a ballot. And so what we’ve seen is, you know, chasing down these sort of false claims and needing to prevent something that’s not actually happening is instead making it more difficult for other people to cast a ballot.
Krys Boyd [00:03:20] This is not to say there aren’t real problems we ought to be paying attention to. One is the aging infrastructure of voting and tabulation systems used around the country. The report notes that most states use systems that are at least a decade old. Some are not even being manufactured anymore. I mean, a decade doesn’t sound like such a long time, Derek. What kinds of problems can accrue from aging equipment?
Derek Tisler [00:03:46] So what we see is a lot of the problems that I think anybody, given how large of a role technology plays in our life, anybody would be familiar with, you know, a lot of us are not still using the same cell phone that we used 10 or 15 years ago or using the same laptop that we did 10 or 15 years ago. And if we were still using that technology, I don’t think that we would be expecting it to function as well as newer technology is able to do. And so that’s kind of the problem with voting machines as well. You know, the most likely challenges that we will see from outdated election equipment is just sort of routine failures. So maybe it’s a it’s a scanner that jams and is unable to accept ballots for a small amount of time. It could be a touchscreen voting system that it takes a vote or maybe more attempts to select the right candidate on a touchscreen. It’s these sort of things, again, that we see every day with technology, but that may come up in the election process as well. The biggest concern is around the outdated voting systems that do not have a paper record of every vote cast. And fortunately, that’s an area where we’ve gained a lot of progress since 2016 to the point that 98% of all votes cast in this election are going to have a paper record of their vote. And that means if there is something wrong with the voting machine, election officials can fall back on those paper records to make sure they have a complete and accurate vote count. So those are some of the biggest challenges that we tend to see with outdated voting systems and other election technology.
Krys Boyd [00:05:29] How important is it that those paper ballots be legible to the voter? Like I voted early the other day and I my machine, it was a machine, but then it printed out a ballot and I was able to look at that ballot and confirm that it reflected the choices that I had made. That was very reassuring. Is that how it works everywhere?
Derek Tisler [00:05:50] Yes, that’s generally how it works. In some cases, the the scanners that count ballots may read timing marks, in some cases barcodes or something like that. But the point is, with the paper record, when election officials, as they do in the vast majority of states, conduct audits after the election, what they’re doing is they are taking a sample of some statistically significant sample of those paper records, and they’re reviewing them with the human eye. And so they’re reading the actual ballot text and they’re comparing it against what the voting machine read on those ballots. And they’re making sure that those voting machines were counted ballots accurately. And so to that extent, you know, even if the scanner itself may be reading something that’s not the actual human readable text, that is what is going to be reviewed when the audit is conducted afterwards. And so we have these sort of checks and safeguards in place. We have the human component. We have technology working side by side to make sure that the vote count is accurate.
Krys Boyd [00:06:57] It is so interesting, and I’m not disagreeing with the importance of paper ballots for verification purposes and for post-election audits and everything else. But it’s interesting that in the 21st century, most of us, you know, never actually have paper versions of our money. For example, you know, are we trust banks with our retirement savings and our home loans and different things. Is there something unusual about voting that requires this kind of physical documentation?
Derek Tisler [00:07:29] There is. And the thing that is unique about voting compared to all of these other transactions, interactions that we have in our life that are so technology dependent, it’s our right to have a secret ballot. So, you know, my election official knows who I am when I register to vote. If I request a mail ballot, they know who I am. When I check in at the polling place, they know who I am. As soon as I mark and cast their ballot, that ballot can no longer be traced back to me and for very good reasons. The secret ballot is a very valued aspect of American democracy, where we don’t want our political leaders knowing who did and intend to vote for them and, you know, maybe being able to enact some sort of retribution against those people who did not support them. So the secret ballot is incredibly important. But what that means is at the end of the day, if you know a machine did not correct them, count my vote correctly. There’s no real way for me to verify that. I can’t look up on an election website afterwards to see exactly how my individual vote was counted. And so that’s why it’s so important to have these, I guess, redundant records, right? We have voting machines available to count ballots, and voting machines are really good at counting ballots. They’re highly accurate, much more accurate than hand counting. They count ballots very quickly. They’re able to get results a whole lot faster than if it was an entirely human process. But then we have these paper records and we can use these to check that the voting machine is working as it should. But really, it’s that it’s that secret ballot that makes voting so distinct from other aspects of our life. And it’s what demands, you know, in some cases using a little bit more of old school processes to make sure that we’re getting it right.
Krys Boyd [00:09:25] Speaking of old school, sometimes the problem is as simple as a voting machine or two going down on Election Day, meaning everybody waits longer to cast a ballot because there are seven machines in the room instead of nine or whatever the case may be. How does this affect the ability of everybody who wishes to vote having the chance to do so?
Derek Tisler [00:09:46] So one important thing to keep in mind is on Election Day, there are going to be over 100,000 polling places in operation across the country. Elections are this enormous operational undertaking operating across these temporary locations. All of this equipment, it’s mostly reliant on individuals who, you know, may only work as a poll worker. Once every two years, once every four years. In that context, it’s not surprising that we’re going to see some you know, things go wrong here and there and individual instances. And one of the most common is exactly what you’re talking about. So a machine that is supposed to accept and scan cast ballots, it can breakdown in the same way that, you know, your printer may break down, your copier may break down. That’s what we see most often is a ballot will jam in there. And in the meantime, until that issue is resolved, election officials have backup plans in place to keep voters able to cast a ballot. And so in this specific instance, the most common backup is there is a secure storage bin. Typically, it’s attached to the voting machine itself. And voters are able to insert their ballot in that secure storage, which the ballots will then be retrieved once there is a working machine that is able to count those. And typically, that retrieval is going to happen with a two person team of poll workers or even a bipartisan team of poll workers to make sure all the processes go as they should. So all that to say anything can go wrong at an individual polling place. But election officials prepare for this and they have a whole set of systems in place and they train poll workers on these systems. So if something does go wrong, there’s a backup plan in place to keep voters voting. In some cases, it may slow things down a little bit. It may lead to longer lines and it may lead to a frustrating process, frankly, for voters. But there are processes in place to make sure that they can continue to cast a ballot and have their vote counted.
Krys Boyd [00:12:04] Longer lines sound like a minor concern unless you have kids returning from school to get home to or an hourly job that has not given you time off to vote. I mean, for some people, if the line is long enough, they might have to decide not to vote.
Derek Tisler [00:12:21] That’s exactly right. Unfortunately, this is something that we do see when lines form. You know, some people, as you said, are just not able to wait in line as long as they should. And that’s why it’s so important to have all the preparation that goes into elections to minimize these sort of errors as much as possible. The testing that’s done on voting equipment, for example, hopefully you can catch as many things as possible before anybody is casting their ballot on this equipment. The thing that I’ll say, you know, when we talk about some of these common issues that can occur with technology, there may be a bit of a reaction to say like, well, maybe we should just get rid of the technology altogether. Right. Technology has greatly improved the election process over the past couple of decades, you know, because most counties now use electronic poll books to check in voters instead of paper poll votes. That process of checking in voters has gotten much faster, much more efficient because of that technology. Again, using voting machines to count ballots, it means we’re counting ballots much more accurately. We’re getting results faster. There are tons of benefits of technology in election, but it’s obviously so important to do as much preparation as possible to minimize these challenges where you can and then again, to have these backup systems in place.
Krys Boyd [00:13:52] Derek, when it comes to this technology, is there like a rule of thumb as to how long electronic voting and counting systems ought to be used before they are either replaced or updated?
Derek Tisler [00:14:03] Yeah. Most experts who study voting systems study voting technology recommend replacing systems every 10 to 15 years or so. This is, you know, fairly similar to a lot of other technology that it’s used across our life. Again, all the technology, it’s going to get a little bit more likely to have problems over time the longer that you wait. So that’s the general recommendation in terms of the lifespan, it’s going to vary a little bit by the technology actually used in each individual place.
Krys Boyd [00:14:41] It can be an expensive proposition, though, right? Who pays for upgrades to voting systems?
Derek Tisler [00:14:47] It happens a little bit differently depending on where you’re at. So to start, you know, in America, election administration is highly decentralized. And so the people with primary responsibility for planning, operating elections are local officials typically are county officials. In some places, it may be city or town officials, but it is local officials who run elections in America. And so it’s sort of by default. It is counties. In some cases cities. But these local units of governments who have to bear the cost of elections. In some states, those costs are offset by states. They vary. In some states, the state will pick up quite a large bit of the tab for operating costs for elections. Some states leave almost everything to the locals. And then finally, especially in recent years, the federal government has taken on more of a role in providing resources for elections. And I think this really started in 2016 when, you know, we had concerns about Russian cyber actors interfering in the process, and more and more people began to realize that election security is national security. And we can’t necessarily expect that local officials are going to have all of the resources that they need to confront national cyber security challenges. And so we saw a huge influx of election funding from 2016 to 2020, around $800 million total. And that was incredibly helpful for a lot of states to get rid of old equipment, especially that equipment that doesn’t have any paper record with an upgrade heading into 2020 or even in the few years since that federal funding declined quite a bit from 2020 to 2024. We’ve only seen about 200 million in election funding during that same time span, but we continue to see federal funding play some role in this process.
Krys Boyd [00:16:58] The Brennan Center report has estimated it would cost about $2.2 billion over five years to enable several critical security systems. Just give us a general outline of what that money could pay for.
Derek Tisler [00:17:14] Yeah, there’s a number of things that that money could pay for. So number one, as we’ve been talking about, is voting equipment that’s generally going to be the largest cost item for election officials. That’s obviously the equipment that voters directly interface with during the election process. And it’s the equipment that you really don’t want something to go wrong on Election Day. Again, for the reasons that we’ve already discussed, it’s going to have a direct impact on voters. So when you need to replace that equipment every 10 to 15 years, you also have maintenance costs. In the meantime, that’s going to be the biggest cost item within that within that total. But then there are a number of other things that we’ve we’ve seen some states adopt in recent years that have been really beneficial for enhancing cybersecurity of the election process, but then also making these sort of technical failures less likely. So one is increasing cybersecurity support for these local officials. There have been a number of states who have adopted something called a cyber navigator program where essentially the state hires cyber security experts who would then go out in the field and support local officials. Because when elections are administered at the local level, the reality is, especially a lot of these smaller counties, they don’t really have dedicated IT support for elections or dedicated cybersecurity expertise. So getting more state staff support who can help out these local counties would greatly boost the security of all election processes. I mentioned earlier audits that take place after election day. So voting equipment is generally tested before Election Day, and then it’s tested after Election Day through audits where again, election workers will look at a sample of paper ballots and compare those against voting machines to confirm that those machines are accurately counting. In recent years, some states have adopted what’s called risk limiting audits. And this is essentially the gold standard of of post-election audits. It’s complicated to explain all the math behind it, but the idea is there are statistical methods you can use to determine how many ballots we would need to count to have confidence that we got the outcome of the election. Correct? Right. These are, you know, broadly available to all states. But there are certain startup costs involved with getting their software in place, getting the training. In some places, you may need to make modifications to the voting equipment to have the processes set up that you would need. And then I think one of the last main cost items that we’ve we’ve looked at is with voter registration systems. Right. So after Hava, the Help America Vote Act was passed in the early 2000s, all states were required to set up an electronic voter registration database, which holds all the voter registration records. Over the years, we’ve seen due to changing election policies. These systems have had to do more and more because they now have to support mail voting and early voting processes and electronic poll books and all of these other ways in which elections have changed over the past two decades. So there’s a lot of modernization that could be done to these systems to make elections more efficient and better serve voters. But a lot of states have not had the resources to make some of these upgrades. So there are a lot of different ways. The point is, elections are always changing. They’re always changing in many positive ways that open up more convenience and opportunity for voters. But then cybersecurity changes are always evolving as well. And so it’s incredibly important that election officials have the resources they need so that their equipment, their processes can keep up with those needs and those challenges.
Krys Boyd [00:21:25] Drilling down on this need for cybersecurity supports. One major concern in the Brennan Center report is the worry about cyber attacks on election systems by foreign powers. What do we know, Derrick, about whether and how often this has happened in the past?
Derek Tisler [00:21:43] Yeah. So we know that this has been a threat at least since 2016, even before then. But I think 2016 it came to light a little bit more where we actually saw some foreign cyber actors from Russia who were essentially taking a look at voter registration systems. There’s no evidence that they were ever able to hack these systems or to change any voter information or anything like that. And importantly, there is no evidence that voting systems or anything else used to determine vote counts has ever been hacked by foreign actors, domestic actors, whatever it may be, in an election. Right. So it’s a lot more about what risks could happen in the future. What we’ve seen much more often in 2020, 2022. And what we’re seeing now, according to intelligence agencies, is that we still have foreign adversaries who are taking an interest in American elections, especially Russia, China and Iran. But it tends to be more about influence and information right there, pushing false accusations about the integrity of elections or about the security of elections. Right. We’re not seeing a lot of cyber activity related to election systems or election technology. So that’s not to say that, you know, absolutely nothing could occur. But those are the more common, more immediate threats that intelligence agencies are pointing out right now in the 2024 election.
Krys Boyd [00:23:31] So I see for adversaries like Russia or Iran or China, even if they can’t break into voting systems and change or delete votes, maybe it’s enough for their purposes just to make us doubt that we can trust the election results.
Derek Tisler [00:23:46] That’s exactly right. This is the the aim that these foreign adversaries have, according to intelligence agencies. They may, in some cases prefer a particular candidate or another, but overall, they’re trying to undermine American democracy and Americans confidence in democracy. And I think they have generally found that the most effective methods for doing that is through this sort of information influence and spreading false information through online channels and amplifying information that gets shared by Americans, undermining the election process, but making sure that that reaches a broader audience. These are generally the tools that we’re seeing as being much, much more effective and a whole lot easier of a target than what election systems are. Especially given all the improvements to security that we’ve seen with election systems since 2016.
Krys Boyd [00:24:50] So these foreign influence campaigns that are happening online, they’re often covert, right? Someone is posing as your American neighbor in some other state with a strong opinion. But in fact, they are their remarks are generated and paid for by, say, Vladimir Putin’s regime.
Derek Tisler [00:25:13] That’s right, Yes. Posing as American actors or as anonymous actors trying as much as possible to make their communications seem authentic, seem like they’re coming from just an ordinary voter in the American election process and then just as much as possible, flooding the zone with that sort of information, hoping these sort of false theories get spread as much as possible and hoping again that the ultimate effect is that Americans will begin to become more divided and lose confidence in our democracy.
Krys Boyd [00:25:54] How does the possibility of these influence campaigns potentially jeopardize the safety of voters and election workers, people who are there at the polling site on Election Day?
Derek Tisler [00:26:05] This is a real risk that we have seen, especially since 2020, as we’ve seen more and more false information about election integrity, these ideas that the election was rigged, that there was widespread fraud, that election workers can’t be trusted. They’ve led some individuals to act on those false rumors and attack election workers themselves with with violent threats, with harassment, with intimidation. We’ve seen since 2020, nearly 1 in 3 local election officials has faced some form of threat or harassment or intimidation just for doing their job. It’s certainly we’ve seen many election officials who, you know, may have been working in elections for years, even decades, have a lot of experience that they chose to leave this profession altogether because they can no longer they can no longer handle this level of vitriol of threats against them for their work. Heading into 2020, I think there has been much more understanding of these possibilities. There has been improved the relationships between election workers and law enforcement just in case there was some emergency that comes up on Election Day. There have been a lot of election officials taking efforts to build connections with their community to open up the process as much as possible to explain what it is that’s happening, and including the fact that elections, you know, as I said previously, decentralized, meaning that when voters go to vote, it is their neighbors who are actually doing the work of running that election as poll workers. So building this sort of understanding of the process, trust in the process has been really integral, but it’s deeply concerning the extent to which false information about elections have sort of fueled violence, threats, harassment against ordinary people who are stepping up to make elections happen.
Krys Boyd [00:28:10] Derek, what can local elections officials or state level officials around the country do to demonstrate that they would never consider putting their thumb on the scale for any party or candidate they happen to favor personally?
Derek Tisler [00:28:24] I think what we have seen election officials doing to try to build confidence is a couple of different things. One emphasized the fact that elections are transparent, all of the key steps from, you know, testing voting equipment before elections to running the actual polling place to counting votes, to running recounts. Those take place under public observation. You know, every state allows some sort of observation, at least for parties and candidates involved in elections. But typically, there are other independent actors or just general members of the public who can watch these processes as well. So that’s number one, sort of saying everything we do takes place in the public eye. Many election officials have gotten steps further by doing things like livestreaming counting of ballots that people, you know, joining from anywhere can see those processes take place. All of it is done under the public eye. The other real emphasis here is the the checks and balances that are inherent to the election process every step of the way. One important step being, there are often, again, requirements to have members of different political parties serving as poll workers at polling places or doing critical tasks like checking in voters or counting ballots, or resolving any discrepancies about how a ballot should be counted if it can be read by a voting machine. There’s never just one individual in charge of these critical tasks. There are multiple people there to make sure everybody is following the processes, following the law as they should. And then also all the steps in place, especially to make sure that we have a complete and accurate vote count. The fact that voting machines are tested, the fact that there is a paper record of ballots that gets audited after the election, the fact that interested parties can bring legal challenges, they can request recounts. The fact that there is a canvasing process done where election workers are resolving any sort of discrepancies that exist across all documentation that they collect from, you know, the number of voters checked in, reports from individual voting systems, the ballots themselves, checking everything to make sure we have accounted for every ballot. Every ballot has only been counted once and we have a complete and accurate vote count.
Krys Boyd [00:30:58] Derek, the report notes the Brennan Center report that threats to election systems and election workers at all. Levels requires a coordinated response. What are some of the agencies that can play a role in this?
Derek Tisler [00:31:12] There are a lot of different agencies that can play a role. You know, we start with the local officials themselves because as I mentioned, it is local officials who do the work of actually running elections across this country. Right. They do so with state support. States will often operate the voter registration system, for example. They may set certain processes that local officials are required to follow. And they provide general support, training, guidance, all of that on how best to run secure and accurate elections at the federal level. We’ve seen a few different roles that have had a lot of value for improving election security. So one is, as I mentioned, Congress providing more resources for election security since 2016. Those resources, that’s the most important thing that the federal government can be doing. Election security is national security, and the federal government has a role in making sure that all local officials have the resources they need to confront any challenges that may impact the election process. Separate from that, the most critical federal agency that has been helping improve election security is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or assessor. This is the federal agency that supports both cybersecurity and physical security of all critical infrastructure across the United States. And election infrastructure is considered critical under federal law. And so this agency has been since 2018, but it has really ramped up since 2020, providing support and expertise to state and local election officials.And so they’ve been, you know, visiting local election offices, for example. They’ve been reviewing processes. They’ve been helping them put in place secure protocols on all of their election technology in the face of, you know, some rising risks of threats or intimidation against election workers. They’ve been helping to make sure that the election offices themselves are physically secure with things like alarm systems or video surveillance or whatever it may be. And then they’ve been providing tailored guidance again on how do we make sure that our election technology is secure, how do we prevent technical failures? All of that to the point is, as I mentioned, in some cases at the state level, but especially at the local level, many election offices just don’t have dedicated cyber security expertise and may only be, you know, 1 or 2 full time staff even in an election office. And with the number of things required to plan and operate an election. Cybersecurity can only take up, you know, part of their time, part of their capacity. And so having more state support, having more federal support to make sure that our systems are secure, to make sure that these local officials have all the support and guidance that they need during the election process is been incredibly important for improving election security since 2016.
Krys Boyd [00:34:46] Since we know the threat of cyber attacks is ongoing. Obviously, the work of identifying vulnerabilities and heading them off is ongoing as well. What is a bug bounty?
Derek Tisler [00:34:58] The idea is there are people who are hackers for good. Essentially, they are researchers who are examining systems and they’re looking for vulnerabilities and they want to do so not to, you know, exploit that technology or use it improperly, but because they care about cybersecurity more broadly. And so a bug bounty kind of sets up a program where if people are researching my technology, they can report it to me and I may offer a reward for that to incentivize more researchers to take a look. And that’s sort of the idea, right? If there is a vulnerability in a system, you would rather it be identified as soon as possible and you’d rather be identified by someone who is not going to misuse that vulnerability necessarily. So this has been, again, prevalent across a number of sectors. In some cases, election offices have started to operate, even if not necessarily bug bounties that come with a reward system, a vulnerability disclosure policy, which essentially says you’re allowed to research our system. Holmes, You have to tell us that you’re doing it. You have to operate within these boundaries to make sure that you’re not doing any damage to our system. And if you operate within these boundaries and you share information with us, we will not take any legal action against you for, you know, again, trying to hack into our systems.
Krys Boyd [00:36:33] The Brennan Center has a number of recommendations for responding to election emergencies. What constitutes an election emergency?
Derek Tisler [00:36:44] A wide range of things can be covered under the umbrella of election and emergencies. But what we’re talking about is anything that may impact a voter’s ability to cast their ballot and to have their vote counted at the end of the day. Right. And so this could be a very large thing, such as, you know, some of the hurricanes that we saw earlier this year and the impact that that had on election administration and election planning. Or it could be as simple as something like a jammed scanner or a electronic poll book that isn’t starting up or is freezing. The point is, we are encouraging election officials as much as possible to think about everything that could happen. Or if you can’t imagine every single emergency that could happen. Think about all of your systems in place. And if any one of those systems was impacted so that you could use it for a period of time or you could use it, but it may slow the voting process down, account for everything that could happen there and say, what is my backup plan? What is my redundancy in place to make sure that voters have options that they can keep casting their ballot and at the end of the day that the ballots they cast will be counted, will be included in the voting total.
Krys Boyd [00:38:11] This is what you call election day fail safes, basically.
Derek Tisler [00:38:15] Yes, that’s exactly right.
Krys Boyd [00:38:18] How can the relevant judges prepare to respond to election emergencies in a timely manner? Like what do they need to be ready to do?
Derek Tisler [00:38:27] In some cases, judges may be brought into the election process because, you know, one of these emergency is one of these disruptions occurs at a polling place. And there may be in some cases, there may be a case where poll workers have and implemented the backup plan correctly. But there may also be cases where there is a backup plan that is available, but it’s not necessarily accounted for by state law because state law can’t imagine every emergency that can happen. And so in that case, a judge may need to come in and give permission or order an election office to implement some sort of failsafe failsafe that will protect voters rights. And so certainly what we would encourage judges in these incidents who are not necessarily subject matter experts and may be brought in under incredible time constraints, especially when we’re talking about just Election Day. There’s only a period of time when polls are actually open and when a remedy will have a meaningful impact. So we encourage judges, you know, as much as possible to have relevant contacts at election offices, for example, where they can talk to election officials, make sure they understand the problem correctly and make sure that any sort of contingency, any sort of remedy that’s put in place is not going to have broader disruptions on the on the voting process. Similarly, there may be cases where judges have to give a specific and set of instructions to poll workers that those voter those poll workers then communicate to voters. And it’s really important that we have clarity in those situations, that voters understand what’s happening, that they’re not more confused by the process and again, that they’re conveying accurate information about elections. So I think that’s the biggest thing that we would encourage judges to do leading up to Election Day. Make sure you have contacts with the people who actually do the work of running elections and that you can have those individuals available to clarify aspects about the process, make sure that whatever you’re doing is helping voters, helping preserve their rights, and not creating more of a disruption to the process.
Krys Boyd [00:40:54] One of the Brennan Center’s report’s top recommendations, which is regulating election vendors, took me entirely by surprise because Derek, I suppose I had assumed these companies were already highly regulated.
Derek Tisler [00:41:09] So there are some federal standards in place. So, you know, I guess the start big picture vendors play a role in basically every aspect of the election process, right? So that includes voter registration systems. That includes vote counting machines. That includes technology that is used to report election results. They touch on a broad number of different key election functions. So when we’re talking about something like voting machines, for example, there are federal standards in place where. In order to get certified by the federal government, which basically any voting vendor needs to do. If election officials are actually going to buy and use their equipment in order to be certified to federal standards, they have to meet certain baselines for security, for accessibility, for user usability, for accuracy. All of these sort of standards to make sure that voting machines are working as they should, that the technology is designed to perform all the functions that are needed before any election official goes and buys that equipment. Increasingly, the independent agency that sets these federal standards, the US Election Assistance Commission, it is a independent agency run by a bipartisan board. This commission is in charge of setting these federal standards for voting systems. They are now expanding standards to cover other election technology. So starting with electronic poll books where they are establishing federal standards that will set certain, again, security accuracy, usability guidelines for electronic poll books, but eventually to ban and cover all election technology used across the process. However, what we have seen when we’ve looked at this issue is that when you compare election technology to other aspects of critical infrastructure, there is not the same level of federal regulatory standards that would guarantee certain internal security protocols within these vendors. And so that’s something that we want to see moving forward just to make sure that, you know, voters, election officials using this technology can have complete confidence in these systems.
Krys Boyd [00:43:44] Given the work you do. Derek, I’m curious, when you go to vote at your local precinct, what are you looking around and paying attention to?
Derek Tisler [00:43:51] So when I go to vote, I think the first thing I’m doing is being friendly to those poll workers. Right. We understand the rising tensions that are taking place in our political environment that are leading people, even if they’re not being hostile or threatening to poll workers. Maybe they’re being they’re being rude, whatever it may be. So I smile at the poll workers. I thank them for helping out. Right. But generally, what I’m looking for as a voter when I walk into the place is just does everything seem to be working as it should? Right. You go to your your check in desk and they check you in on the poll book. Your information is there. You get your correct ballot. You either hand mark your ballot or use a touch screen system to mark your ballot. I always make sure and I really, really encourage all voters to make sure before you cast your ballot, just review every choice down there, make sure everything is marked as it should. If there are any issues that you have during the voting process, so maybe use the touch screen machine and it printed out your ballot and something isn’t what you thought you had selected. Talk to the poll workers. Right. They are there to help resolve any issues. You can spoil that ballot. You can ask for a new one. You’re never forced to cast a ballot that doesn’t correctly reflect your choices. And I think that applies to everything that you’re doing in the voting process. Again, I encourage people to have patience, to have understanding that these are people who are sacrificing their time to be a part of democracy and to run polling places. But always, always raise an issue with poll workers. If you have anything going on, if you don’t understand the process, if something isn’t working for you, if you have questions about how your ballots going to be counted, raise that issue with poll workers. Make sure you communicate about it.
Krys Boyd [00:45:47] Derek Tisler is counsel in the elections and government program at the Brennan Center for Justice, a nonpartisan law and policy institute. You can learn more about election security at brennancenter.org. Derek, thank you for making time to talk today.
Derek Tisler [00:46:01] Yeah of course, thank you so much.
Krys Boyd [00:46:03] Think is distributed by PRX, the public radio exchange. Again, I’m Krys Boyd. Thanks for listening. Have a great day.
