Iranian Leaders AP News

A weakened Iran is still dangerous

The quickly shifting political landscape in the Middle East has Iran recalculating its place in the global order. Council on Foreign Relations president emeritus Richard Haass joins host Krys Boyd to discuss Iran after Israel’s crippling blows to the leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah — and the possibility of inroads for U.S. diplomacy. His article “The Iran Opportunity” was published in Foreign Affairs.

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    Transcript

    Krys Boyd [00:00:00] If you look at just some raw numbers, it would seem like Iran shouldn’t be a major headache for America and its allies. Our population is four times theirs, our landmass nearly six times larger, our GDP more than 60 times greater. And yet Iran has been a persistent source of worry for the United States especially, and ironically, since it gained enormous regional power in the aftermath of the U.S. war in Iraq. But here’s another irony. While Iran has been a key supporter of terrorist and militia groups sowing chaos in parts of the Middle East, the Hamas attack on Israel that initially seemed like a victory for Iran has turned out to be the start of a significant reversal of fortune. From KERA in Dallas, this is Think. I’m Krys Boyd. A weakened Iran still poses hazards to the U.S. and its allies, but also some major possible inroads for achieving American objectives. My guest believes we need to move quickly on this, but also carefully. Richard Haass is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and senior counselor at Centerview Partners. His article, “The Iran Opportunity,” appears in Foreign Affairs magazine. Richard, welcome back to Think.

     

    Richard Haass [00:01:11] Good to be with you.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:01:12] You opened your essay by stating a fact that may take some listeners by surprise. Iran has lost a huge amount of influence in a very short time. Before we get into how that happened, will you give us a sense of the regional leverage Iran enjoyed just a couple of years ago?

     

    Richard Haass [00:01:29] Sure. People were talking about a Shia crescent, essentially a successful manifestation of Iranian imperialism. Iran is probably the principal external influence now in Iraq. It replaced the United States in that role. Iran had put Bush or cap Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria. Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, was a so-called state within a state. And Lebanon was extraordinarily powerful. Iran was the principal or is the principal external backer of Hamas, which, what, 15 or so months ago undertook the October 7th attacks. So you add all that up. So Iran regionally was extraordinarily powerful, plus exporting somewhat 3 million barrels a day of oil. Its principal customer is China. So all of that essentially made Iran in some ways one of the two most important countries in the region, along with Israel. Or three, if you want to include Saudi Arabia four if you want to include Turkey. My point is simply that Iran was a clear, important, influential regional power.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:02:47] You mentioned that Shia crescent. Iran’s leadership is Shia, as are most of the nonstate militant actors it has supported in its own neighborhood. Why then, did Iran funnel money and weapons and training support to a Sunni groups like Hamas in Gaza?

     

    Richard Haass [00:03:02] It’s a it’s a good question. Simply that their shared radicalism, their shared antipathy towards Israel and its backers in the West, principally the United States, that turned out to be more of a bind than any differences. Also, they weren’t fighting over the same space. It wasn’t as if Iran had. It was backing someone else fighting Hamas instead. It was opportunism on Iran’s Part one. Hamas emerged dominant in Gaza in 2006. Iran was more more than ready to put aside, shall we say, religious considerations and put to the fore geopolitical considerations. So, you know, it’s the old expression politics makes strange bedfellows. But this was geopolitics making strange bedfellows.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:03:52] Did Iran’s support of Hamas help Hamas win control of Gaza away from the Palestinian Authority, or did that support come after.

     

    Richard Haass [00:03:59] Mostly came after? There may have been some before. I actually don’t remember what really allowed Hamas to come to the fore. But it was two things. One was its own discipline and they had been building up for years. I expect some of that support came from Iran. What’s also important is when you had elections in Gaza, and I think it was 2005, the Palestinian Authority offered had several candidates for each position. Hamas was much more disciplined than had won. So Hamas ended up putting together a majority government with a plurality of the of the votes simply because their opponents were not strategic or disciplined. And once Hamas emerged after those elections, there was a bit of a civil war with the Palestinian Authority there. They were helped by by Iran. Iran saw the Palestinian Authority as too close to Israel and the United States and some of the Gulf countries and Iran support. For Hamas only increased in the aftermath.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:05:02] And what has been the effect of Iran’s support of Hezbollah on the stronghold in Lebanon and therefore the security of Israel.

     

    Richard Haass [00:05:12] It was critical, Iran was the principal supporter and supplier of Hezbollah. That’s why gaining control or heavy influence in Syria was so important when the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, was on the ropes in the second decade of the century, around 2012 2013, with the Arab Spring, Iran, along with Russia, essentially bailed them out. And one of the values of that is Iran then gained the ability to use Syrian territory as a safe land route over which or through which to supply Hezbollah. And Hezbollah, again, was the dominant, if you will, external, but really internal force in Lebanon. It was more than a match for the Lebanese army, more than a match for international forces there. Plus, it was so valuable to Iran, not simply for reasons of wanting to have influence in Lebanon, but by having Hezbollah with all of its weapons, able to hit Israel. So it was thought with a powerful deterrent.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:06:13] You say so it was thought Assad is now deposed from leadership as of late last year. Russia’s attention is obviously primarily on Ukraine. Will Iran be able to exert much control over what happens next in Syria?

     

    Richard Haass [00:06:25] It’ll be a player, but I think right now, probably a more powerful external force is Turkey. Turkey has a real incentive to play a role. It wants the several million Syrian refugees in Turkey to go home. It sees rebuilding Syria as a are a real economic opportunity. Syria also is probably going to become much more absolutist in its religious fervor. That doesn’t necessarily mean Iran will have influence. It could be some of the Sunni countries. It’s not it’s not clear ISIS can make a bit of a return. That’s not necessarily good for Iran. So my own sense is Iran will become one of many outsiders rather than first among equals.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:07:07] Okay. This Hamas attack on Israel that sparked that terrible war initially looked like a win for Iran and Iranian allies and interests. Why was that such a short lived, apparent victory?

     

    Richard Haass [00:07:19] Well, you’re right. If one were writing the story of October 7th and you ended it on October 7th or 8th, you would have said absolutely it was a surprise attack that caused, what, over 1200 Israelis to lose their lives. Several hundred were taken hostage for Hamas, who demonstrated that they were the only Palestinian entity willing and able to characteristics, willing and able to effectively take on Israel. And for Iran, it was a good thing because it basically showed that its proxy was an effective fighting force against the against the Jewish state. The problem is that in the 15 or so months since, Hamas has steadily lost ground, has been militarily badly degraded. Israel has caused enormous damage to Hamas. It was estimated there were maybe 30- 35,000 Hamas fighters to begin with. Most people think that’s at least been half, maybe more. Plus, a lot of those fighters, at least until the recent cease fire for holding up in tunnels, not really able to do anything even remotely like an October 7th kind of operation. And meanwhile, more important, other things were happening in the region. We alluded to it, the removal of the regime in Syria, the more than decimation, the devastation of the leadership and fighting force of Hezbollah. So all these entities that are associated that were associated or associated with Iran are much the weaker.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:08:58] Yeah, there were some direct Iranian attacks on Israeli territory that did very little damage right.

     

    Richard Haass [00:09:04] 100%. They did very little damage. Israel then retaliated with a degree of restraint. But what was so interesting, particularly about the second retaliation, I think it was this past October, is that Israel essentially demonstrated its ability to operate in the era of Iran with impunity. They took out air defenses or took out ammunition stockpiles and production facilities. And it sent a very powerful message to Iran that any time we want to, we can operate over your territory. Meaning if we so chose, we could go after your energy installations or we could go after your nuclear installations. So it was a very powerful message, implicitly sent to the government of Iran.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:09:46] I don’t want to digress for too long from this conversation about Iran, but do you expect the cease fire in Gaza to hold? I mean, what are the factors that will affect that?

     

    Richard Haass [00:09:56] If we had this conversation a couple of days ago, I would have said hold at least to a point, just to be just to remind people what what we have. We have a three phase cease fire. We’re now in the early days of a 42 day cease fire, essentially consisting of a hostage release. I think it’s 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for 50 times that many Palestinian prisoners being held in jails and in the West Bank, the occupied west West Bank, also Israel, besides the cease fire, agreed to move its forces away from the center of of Gaza from populated areas, agreed to let in more humanitarian aid and so forth. I think this first phase will probably go through the second phase, which is meant to start in 42 days. I’m increasingly worried what may not happen, that as much as Israel wants to get the remaining hostages back, both alive and dead, that there’s real concern that if they were to leave all of Gaza, it would create a security vacuum that only Hamas is in a position to exploit. And we saw some of that the other day when the three Israeli women hostages were being driven through Gaza. And we saw suddenly Hamas come out of the out of out of the tunnels and act with just with a brazen confidence. And also, Israel would have to agree to a permanent end to the war. Well, if they do that, that would essentially mean that they will never realize their stated ambition of complete elimination and quote unquote, of Hamas. But that would make it explicit. So it’s not clear to me that the second phase of the cease fire, as much as Israel wants to get the remaining hostages back. It’s not clear to me it will necessarily go ahead in the third phase, which is all about the reconstruction of Gaza and so forth. I simply don’t think that’s in the cards any time soon. You don’t have a force that could provide stability and governance in Gaza. Right now, you’ve only got two forces, Hamas and the Israeli Defense Forces. You don’t have anything like an international or Arab stabilization force. So we would have an enormous way to go before that became even imaginable.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:12:18] And even if all parties were willing and proceeding along that course, I mean, the scale of the destruction in Gaza is very difficult to get your head around.

     

    Richard Haass [00:12:26] Much of Gaza has been made uninhabitable. To rebuild, it would take a lot of time, a lot of money and a lot of peace in order for the money to come in for the governments that would provide the money, particularly in the Middle East, would have to be confident that they were not wasting it. So that would mean a really not just a cease fire, but something something more than that, something with the expectation that it would it would endure. One of the reasons this is so difficult is that Hamas is essentially politically unchallenged in Gaza. One of the things the Israeli government has refused to do is address the so-called day after. What will this governance situation look like from the security or political or economic perspective? They do not want to introduce any policy which would have a large Palestinian dimension. The reason being that there’s important elements of this Israeli government on the Israeli political spectrum that don’t want to set in motion anything that over time could lead to real momentum towards Palestinian nationalism and even to creation one day of a Palestinian state. So as a result, they’re unwilling to put in motion anything that could provide a Palestinian political alternative to Hamas. And people like me have been critical of this, saying almost in the old American sense, you can’t beat something with nothing if you want to sideline or marginalize Hamas. You’ve got to show to the bulk of Palestinians that there’s an alternative.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:14:01] Richard, today you think Iran is as weak as it has been since the 1979 revolution, or at least since its long war with Iraq? Is a weakened Iran dangerous in different ways for the United States and its allies from a very strong Iran?

     

    Richard Haass [00:14:19] An interesting question. Iran is dangerous for any number of reasons, but all things being equal, I would much prefer a weak Iran than a strong Iran that has fewer instruments. Fewer forces or partners which could cause real damage. Yeah, but to say it’s weak or that it’s down, it doesn’t mean it’s out. That doesn’t mean it’s disarmed. So it can still do all sorts of things if it if it chose to. So I think we have to take it. We have to take it seriously. Plus, there’s been an interesting wrinkle since I wrote the article. A few days ago, iran and Russia signed a new a new agreement. Not quite clear the details, but clearly the two countries have moved much closer together and it’s reduced Iran’s international isolation. We’ll have to see what Russia is willing and able to do for it. And I could expect I expect that might be willing to do some things to help Iran in exchange for Iranian help with its war in Ukraine in some ways analogous to its relationship, North Korea. I’m not suggesting that Iran would send forces to fight, as the North Koreans have. But I could see Iran providing various types of drone or other missiles or technologies in exchange for certain types of Russian military help in order to get it back on its feet.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:15:41] All right. So this creates some big choices for the United States in its dealings with Iran. What are some potential options on the table right now?

     

    Richard Haass [00:15:52] Sure. But look, before we talk about options, Krys, why don’t we just take a second and talk about goals. There’s three things about Iran that give the United States real pause. One is obviously Iran’s nuclear program. Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons, but it’s dramatically reduced the time it would need to field several of them. It has plenty of the nuclear material. What it seems to be missing is some of the technology in the light that you would actually need to weaponize a nuclear weapon. That’s why, again, the Russian connection is worrisome because that could shrink the time. But that’s that’s the biggest concern for Israelis or for Americans. If Iran ever got a nuclear weapon, the threat it could pose to Israel and might give Iran the cover, it would want to unleash its proxies. It also could create a nuclear arms race in the in the region. And just when you thought the Middle East couldn’t get worse, it would. So that’s that’s one set of concerns. The second set of concerns is what we’ve been talking about, Iran’s proxies. We’ve talked about Hezbollah. We’ve talked about Hamas. The third proxy group is the Houthis, who are based in Yemen and have been interfering with global shipping in the Red Sea, have also periodically attacked Israel. So another goal is to put an end or severe limits on Iranian support for their proxies. And a third set of concerns is what Iran’s doing inside Iran and its lack of respect for women, for human rights and so forth. It’s running a truly repressive society, and a lot of people would want the West and the United States and others to become backers of a political revolution or even political change inside Iran. So there’s three sets of concerns. I would say the most important of the three is the nuclear power to prevent Iran from getting any closer, to say the least, to to a nuclear weapon. The second is to limit or end its support for proxies. And the third, I would say, is the internal. Not that it doesn’t matter. But I’d say the other to take priority and it’s extraordinarily difficult for outsiders to influence the trajectory of what goes on inside Iran. To do these things, there’s lots of ideas. Some would say, let’s use military force. That’s always risky and dangerous, but I wouldn’t rule it out. I would say, first, let’s try diplomacy. Let’s approach or I would hope the new administration would consider approaching Iran. The United States has tried diplomacy with Iran before. We had an agreement in 2015 negotiated by the Obama administration. Donald Trump in his first term decided it was worse than nothing, so he left it. But the idea is now could you do something bigger than that and maybe try to negotiate an agreement that puts significant limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, that puts significant constraints on its support  for proxies.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:18:54] Before we explore all of that in more detail. I just want to make sure that I understand the dimensions of the nuclear threat from Iran as it exists right now. You mentioned this agreement with Russia. We may not know all the details within that. Is it possible that Russia could could trade nuclear weapons to Iran or would it be a matter of sharing technologies and material to construct a weapon?

     

    Richard Haass [00:19:18] I would think the more likely thing would be what you suggested, that Russia could provide Iran with certain type of technical help that would dramatically shorten the amount of time they would need to get from where they are to actually fielding a nuclear weapon, several nuclear weapons. They already have The raw material there would probably take a maybe a week or two to increase the concentration of certain kinds of uranium, so-called enrichment process. So that would maybe take a week or two, and Russia could again dramatically shorten what would now take six months, maybe nine months or a year. They could make it a matter of weeks if they transferred technology. And unlike a nuclear weapon, that would be much harder to trace. I don’t think Russia would want it to be traced that they provided weapons out of their own stockpile. But the idea that they might provide technology, well, that sort of thing has happened behind the scenes over the years with any number of countries. Used to be something that Pakistan often did. And I expect Russia might be doing it with North Korea now. So I think that would be a possible a possible course of action. And it’s one that we ought to be worried about.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:20:29] And, of course, in addition to the direct potential for a nuclear attack somewhere by Iran, as you mentioned, a nuclear armed Iran might cause other regional actors to seek similar weapons of their own. What countries would be the primary candidates for acquiring their own nuclear weapons because Iran now has them?

     

    Richard Haass [00:20:47] At a minimum, I think we’re talking about Saudi Arabia and. Turkey. I wouldn’t rule out the United Arab Emirates. I wouldn’t rule out Egypt and show us some could develop them themselves. More likely, they would acquire it one way or another from, say, a Pakistan, from a China or some other country. And what’s so dangerous about this? The mere fact that countries are moving in that direction could invite a war to try to prevent it. If you have a crisis, the idea that you have several countries not with enormous nuclear forces like the United States and Russia have, which which can survive a first strike, but forces that could be eliminated in a first strike, then it puts tremendous incentive to go first in a crisis, to basically try to reach to try to remove nuclear weapons before they could be used. So the mere fact you have a crisis or a growth in tension could actually lead to a it could lead to a conflict. You also don’t know in this part of the world of nuclear weapons or materials could easily get into the hands of terrorist groups. So I create any number of nightmare scenarios if the Middle East begins to begins to go down this path.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:22:07] Some observers think the United States could take this moment to try and bring an end to the regime in Iran. Before we consider the wisdom of that. In theory, what tools could the U.S. use to bring something like that about?

     

    Richard Haass [00:22:23] It’s hard to answer your question with confidence or specificity because we simply don’t know. The idea that the CIA could launch some minor operation, I think that’s that’s better for the movies than for reality. I don’t see this Iranian regime being on the precipice. That’s not to say it’s not unpopular. It’s not to say they don’t have severe, severe economic problems. But I don’t I don’t sense it’s it’s about to fall over the edge. Some would say a use of force that humiliated the regime could do it, maybe, but it could also trigger a kind of opposite effect, a rally around the flag. Let’s protect the homeland against these these foreign invaders. We already try economic sanctions. I guess you could add to that. But Iran now has, you know, through Russia and China, ways of evading, evading sanctions. You could broadcast things into there. But again, I doubt it would be it would be decisive. So I could you know, there’s things we could do. But I’ll be honest with you, I don’t see anything that of the sort that, for example, if you worked for President Trump, you could walk into the Oval Office and say, Mr. President, if you were to greenlight our doing A, B, and C, it would likely would certainly have the effect of ousting the Iranian regime. I can’t imagine what that would be.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:23:48] What makes the current Iranian regime more stable? If nothing else, then, like Iraq under Saddam or Syria, Under Assad or Libya under Gadhafi?

     

    Richard Haass [00:23:58] It’s an important question. A lot of these other regimes, the ones you mentioned, and Bashar al-Assad as the most recent example I would describe as highly personal listening. By that I mean these are regimes built around a person. Often they’re hereditary and often built around a minority slice of the population. For Saddam, it was the Sunnis in Iraq. For Bashar al-Assad, it was the Alawite sect in Syria. They are very small security forces, more to keep them in power, to guard against coups than to fight wars against foreign neighbors. And they don’t really have institutions. They’re, again, very narrowly based and they turn out to be brittle. And we saw that in Libya. We saw that in Iraq. We saw that in Syria. When they go, they go unlike, say, at the opposite end of the spectrum, China. China is a country with, what, 90 to 100 million people in the Communist Party. And you have all sorts of institutions and overlapping authorities and and so forth. So if tomorrow if something were to happen to Xi Jinping, China would be relatively stable. You would have mechanisms for succession and it would be accepted by the bulk of the population. Iran is not China, but nor is it, nor is it Syria or Iraq or Libya. You have all sorts of institutions of governance. This it’s been around since, what, 1979 and you’ve had peaceful transfer of power. Just recently, you had the Iranian president died in a helicopter crash and a new Iranian president was named. Rather quickly, you have mechanisms for choosing the next ayatollah, one when the current one dies and you have various military and paramilitary forces that are loyal to the regime. So my my reading of Iran is that while there’s strong opposition to the regime, it’s not brittle, it’s not on a knife edge. It’s not it’s not without institutions and significant internal resilience. So my my own reading of it and, you know, other guests one day on your show might disagree with me, but my own sense is that the regime has some staying power. I’m not going to say it’s it’s permanent. I’m not going to say it couldn’t be shaken. But all things being equal, I don’t think we can design policy on the premise that this is a situation that’s ripe for dramatic change.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:26:36] It’s worth stating the obvious here, Richard, which is that the removal of bad actors running a hostile country doesn’t even guarantee their replacement with anything better. Right?

     

    Richard Haass [00:26:48] Yeah. It’s one of life’s disappointments, isn’t it? No, but you’re absolutely right. You know, even if you were able to necessarily, one way or another bring about regime change, you can never be confident what would what will take its place. And also the initial entity or individual that takes its place might not be the one that six months or six years later is in place. I would simply say that, you know, the history of regime change efforts and results counsels modesty about what you can do and what you can expect. So, again, I just don’t think it’s a it ought to occupy a central piece of American foreign policy. Rather, I think the principal thrust of American foreign policy ought to be to influence the foreign policy choices of others. And I think that’s true of China or Russia or in this case, Iran, that we ought to try to influence their their calculations rather than try to bring about, shall we say, a different regime that changes its nature.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:27:54] What strategies could the United States pursue in trying to shape Iran’s external behavior? First, whatever policies it might pursue that directly affect other countries outside its own borders.

     

    Richard Haass [00:28:05] Well, my preferred approach would be a so-called grand bargain, where we go to Iran and we’d say, Look, here’s what we’re prepared to live with. We’re not trying to overthrow you, by the way, which is one of the incentives we would give them to to work with us. We are prepared to alleviate some of the economic hardship. But and it’s a big but here’s what we would require from you. And we would spell out our requirements in the nuclear sphere. We would have to have a real ceiling on their capabilities and activities, and it would have to be transparent so we could make sure there wasn’t cheating. We would want to put draconian limits on their military support for proxy groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Hutus. We might also want to introduce an internal dimension, saying, look, we’d be willing to further reduce sanctions beyond what we’re prepared to do. If you were to take these steps, for example, in your treatment of women or dissidents. So we would tell Iran, if you’re willing to do that, here’s the diplomatic here’s the economic benefits that would accrue to you. You’ll avoid all anything military from from us. And we’ll see what the Iranians say. If not, we always retain the option, among other things, of increasing sanctions. If there’s much more we can do that we’re not already doing or using military force against their nuclear installations, against their military installations and so forth. So we could always go down the military path. And I would suggest we do is make clear what our goals are. Basically say to the Iranians, you have a choice on how we’re going to go about accomplishing these goals. We would prefer to have it be diplomatic, but we’re prepared to do it militarily. And for those who say why not just do it militarily? Well, any time you unleash military force, it’s going to it’s there’s uncertainties and costs associated with it. And even if Iran is weak, there’s lots of damage they could cost to Israel, to U.S. forces nearby in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere. And also they could cause real havoc to the regional regional oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. So I don’t think we we ought to, shall we say, what rush to use military force here? We just ought not to rule it out if it becomes necessary.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:30:22] Richard, what would convince Iran using this grand bargain that may or may not be achievable, not to resume or reinforce its support of non-state actors operating elsewhere in the region? Like what’s in it for Iran to agree not to do that?

     

    Richard Haass [00:30:39] What’s in it for them as they avoid getting attacked militarily by the US or Israel and that they get some economic help to shore up their government and their system. There is disaffection. There is frustration in Iraq. And they don’t want to push their own people to the to the breaking point. There’s an interesting historical precedent, Krys. If you go back to the Iran-Iraq war, which basically took part in the 80s, Iran ultimately accepted peace even though it had accomplished all of its goals. And the reason was the Ayatollah Khomeini at the time says about ten years after the Iranian revolution, basically said this is this is like drinking poison, but I will drink it. I will accept this outcome because I need to preserve the revolution. This war has become so costly in terms of human life and distraction and economics that is threatening what we what we set out to accomplish a decade before when they overthrew the Shah. And that’s what I’m hoping now, is that Iran is economically feeling the heat and militarily it’s vulnerable to Israel, that I’m hoping that they see the avoidance of further attacks and getting some economic relief as preferable to continuing for the time being their their radical foreign policy. I can’t sit here and tell you that at some point they may have a different calculation if they get through this, but then we always retain abilities to use military force if need be, but that’s their incentive; that the regime survives to live another day and maybe to fight another day.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:32:16] Speaking of drinking poison, did U.S. leaders anticipate Iran as the regional beneficiary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003?

     

    Richard Haass [00:32:27] Well, I was in the government at that time, and one of the many reasons I put forward not to go to war in 2003 was just that that I argued that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, for all of its unattractive features, was something of a balancer against against Iran. Indeed, that was the logic where we had often, quote unquote tilted or engaged Saddam Hussein various at various times in his career in order to balance off of Iran, which was a more revolutionary actor in the region. So, yes, it was predicted and it was dismissed in part because many of the advocates of the war. Against or against Iraq thought that once things changed in Iraq, Iran wouldn’t be far behind. So they thought that a successful military war against Saddam Hussein would transform not just Iraq, but the region. I, shall we say, did not share their enthusiasm or their optimism. Unfortunately, I think I was proven more right than many of my former colleagues.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:33:40] What would Iran be allowed to offer to neighboring countries under this grand bargain if they can no longer send, you know, military support or fund terrorist activities? How could they influence their neighbors?

     

    Richard Haass [00:33:55] They could provide diplomatic support, political support, economic support. And we could argue about whether in some cases there might be some forms of limited military support for self-defense or certain groups. But basically, there should be no place for independent armed groups within sovereign countries. You shouldn’t have a Hezbollah. Operating in Lebanon. You shouldn’t have a Hamas and an OS in Gaza that has no real self-rule. And I realize we have to get there, but that should be the goal.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:34:29] I recognize that this grand bargain is quite tenuous at the moment. Could it ultimately be more beneficial from a U.S. perspective than the terms of the JCPOA, which was tanked by the first Trump administration?

     

    Richard Haass [00:34:41] Absolutely. JCPOA was nuclear only, and it was time limited. What I’ve proposed is not nuclear only, it’s it’s nuclear principally, but it also includes includes significant constraints on what Iran could do in the way of supporting proxies. And I don’t think it ought to be time limited. I never understood why the JCPOA had various cliffs for up to ten years or 15 years or whatever. Iran would be let off the hook. I just never understood that this ought to be a permanent goal or requirement, a US foreign policy, an Iranian nuclear weapon in the year 2040 ought to be no more acceptable than an Iranian nuclear weapon is today. And it’s not. So I never understood the time limited approach of the Obama administration.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:35:28] It did sound a little bit like a like a balloon mortgage where favorable terms now, But you’re going to have to, you know, negotiate the whole thing again in a pretty short amount of time initially.

     

    Richard Haass [00:35:39] That was true is one of the reasons that president the presidency last time around, the first administration got out of it. They felt we had given up an awful lot not to get enough, not to get a lot. And what we got was, again, for a period of time, we got something. So I thought we we paid too much and got too little for that agreement.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:35:57] If a willingness to use military power to force Iran’s hand or ensure that they execute some grand bargain that has been struck is an important potential tool. What shape could such threats take?

     

    Richard Haass [00:36:11] I believe it would largely be carried out by aircraft and cruise missiles. Right now, Iran is not a difficult airspace to fly over, as the Israelis have demonstrated. And again, it could be an Israeli operation, American operation or a joint operation. I think the most important thing would be to take out known facilities that are targetable associated with the nuclear program. You wouldn’t destroy everything, but you’d buy yourself considerable time in multiple years. And I would take out known military sites where various types of missiles and munitions are being produced and stored, much as Israel did a few a few months ago. And I think, again, the United States and Israel can do it with a limited number of aircraft and missiles.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:36:56] So how could the use of what you might characterize as premature military force against Iran without attempts at diplomatic deal making or coercion backfire for the U.S. and its allies?

     

    Richard Haass [00:37:09] Right now. There might be a lot of people in the region of the world who would say, Why did you do that? In any event, try diplomacy. And my own diplomatic experience. It’s often better to try diplomacy and even fail at it. Before you go to war and build new domestic and international support, which could be a kind of a cushion if and when things get difficult or expensive. It’s one of the reasons we try to negotiate an outcome. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. We tried diplomacy not because we were optimistic would work, but we thought it was a necessary box to check if we were going to use military force in terms of managing the regional and global and domestic political conversation. I think we were right. Second of all, I don’t think anybody should ever go off to war lightly, assuming that it will only accomplish what you want and not cause the destruction of things yet that you don’t want to see. It’s not just the war caused the loss of innocent life, but also Iran has all sorts of tools to retaliate to terrorism that could do. It still has thousands of missiles it could unleash. It could attack Saudi Arabia. The price of energy could, could, could skyrocket. The Houthis could target and do certain things against US ships. You see, Iran is weakened again. It’s down, but not out. So I think it would be a big, big mistake to assume we could we could introduce force and it would be a one sided war. I just don’t see it that way. And certainly you can’t assume it that that would be the case.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:38:41] You already explained that U.S. economic sanctions against Iran have limited effect because Iran still has powerful allies elsewhere in the world that are happy to do business with it. Under what conditions might some deal we offered Iran enable sanctions relief?

     

    Richard Haass [00:38:58] I think that would probably have to be part of the package for us that would say to the Iranians, if you did this on the nuclear or this on the proxy front. Here’s the upside to you. We would reduce this set of sanctions and so forth affecting whether it’s the oil industry or other parts of the Iranian economy. And I would think that would have to be part of the that would be part of the negotiating package.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:39:21] So, Richard, do you perceive a willingness on the part of this new Trump administration to take up this sort of deal making with Iran?

     

    Richard Haass [00:39:29] Marco Rubio just got confirmed. I haven’t had a chance to talk with him about it and got confirmed. The secretary of state I haven’t spoken to the national security adviser about it and people are just settling into their new roles. But there are several things President Trump said in his inaugural that intrigued me. He talked about being a peacemaker and so forth. So. I don’t see that this is something he would be allergic to try. He went to great lengths to cut a deal with North Korea in his first term. Why wouldn’t you go to considerable lengths to cut a deal with with Iran, particularly if it helped not just deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge, but with the larger Middle East and regional challenge? And again, he’s not anxious to use military force. He made that clear also in his inaugural. Well, this is a way to potentially avoid the. You work something out with Iran. And he could get something. You know, the analogy I drew was, funnily enough, to the to the NAFTA trade agreement. Donald Trump is known for opposing trade agreements, but he supported the revision of NAFTA, the Usmca with Mexico and Canada, even though it wasn’t much different because he negotiated it in his first term. Well, Donald Trump totally disparaged and pulled out of the JCPOA that had been negotiated by the Obama administration. But here’s his chance to negotiate something much better that’s open ended or a longer time with a much longer time horizon and is more comprehensive. So, again, I see things in his first term. I heard things in a speech that suggests to me this might appeal to him. Donald Trump likes doing big, dramatic things that change the equation. So I would think this is something that might appeal to him.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:41:18] Any clues about the president’s intentions from his consideration of former intelligence chief Richard Grenell for the position of special envoy to Iran?

     

    Richard Haass [00:41:27] I do not. I don’t know how to read that. You know, special envoys, it depends a bit on the envoy, but they’re not lone wolves. They’re not freelancers. So I think the real question is what kind of guidance somebody like Richard Grenell would get from the secretary of state, from the national security adviser, above all from the from the president. And that’s yet to be determined.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:41:49] You end this essay with an admonition that the U.S. probably needs to take some kind of definitive action sooner rather than later. Do you perceive, in effect, a deadline after which this window of dealmaking opportunity with Iran might close?

     

    Richard Haass [00:42:05] Let me suggest two kinds of deadlines. One is simply, look, Iran will find ways to recover. It’s been hurt badly by events over the last few months. We shouldn’t assume that’s permanent. And as we discussed a few minutes ago, the fact that Iran has drawn closer to Russia is a warning that time, per se, is not our friend here, that Iran will again, we’ll find ways to to get back on its feet. Second of all, it’s quite possible that Iran will continue advancing its nuclear program. So the other reason I feel the degree of pressure is I don’t want Iran to pass certain points of capacity or capability, so I would say very early on we ought to start this and make it clear to Iran that if they were to do certain things, they would that would risk with high, high certainty American or Israeli military action. So I would I would get involved in this sooner rather than later. You know, I always say the Middle East is not like a good bottle of red wine, you don’t put it down and return to it in a year and think it’s going to be better. This is one of those situations. I would turn to it quickly.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:43:13] And I think I perceived a certain amount of confidence in Marco Rubio’s abilities to be a successful secretary of state. I mean, he’s just getting started. What are your thoughts on Rubio?

     

    Richard Haass [00:43:24] It’s nice to get confirmed unanimously. Not a lot of people can take can can claim that this is widely respected, I think is the challenges he faces because he’s not been a lifelong friend of the president say like a Jim Baker was with George Bush. The father inherits a really weak State Department. State Department is much weaker than it was. A lot of talent has left in recent years and decades. By contrast, the White House, the National Security Council and its staff have become far more strategic, far stronger. So the State Department is both weaker in absolute terms and much weaker in relative terms. Plus, you just referred to a special envoy. There’s a lot of special envoys. Now. We’ve got the bizarre situation where we not only have an ambassador to the United Kingdom, we have a special envoy to the United Kingdom. Let me just say, that’s a first. So Marco Rubio is going to be working, shall we say, a crowded space. There’s going to be outsiders with a say like Jared Kushner plus. I hope you’re sitting down, Krys, but Donald Trump’s been known to get up in the middle of night and put stuff out on social media. So it can be very hard when you’re a secretary of state half a world away managing this and being up being effective in this kind of at times chaotic or certainly I’ll be more generous, dynamic environment. So I think he’s talented. He comes in again with a lot of goodwill. I just think he’s walking into an extremely difficult situation.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:45:00] Richard Haass is senior counselor at Centerview Partners and president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. His article, “The Iran Opportunity,” appears in Foreign Affairs magazine. Richard, thanks so much for making time for the conversation.

     

    Richard Haass [00:45:13] Thank you. I enjoyed it.

     

    Krys Boyd [00:45:15] Think is distributed by PRX, the public radio exchange. You can find us on Facebook and Instagram and anywhere you get podcasts. Our website is think.kera.org. Again, I’m Krys Boyd. Thanks for listening. Have a great day.